1142 lines
39 KiB
Lua
1142 lines
39 KiB
Lua
local coroutine = require "coroutine"
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local math = require "math"
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local nmap = require "nmap"
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local outlib = require "outlib"
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local shortport = require "shortport"
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local sslcert = require "sslcert"
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local stdnse = require "stdnse"
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local string = require "string"
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local table = require "table"
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local tls = require "tls"
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description = [[
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This script repeatedly initiates SSLv3/TLS connections, each time trying a new
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cipher or compressor while recording whether a host accepts or rejects it. The
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end result is a list of all the ciphersuites and compressors that a server accepts.
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Each ciphersuite is shown with a letter grade (A through F) indicating the
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strength of the connection. The grade is based on the cryptographic strength of
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the key exchange and of the stream cipher. The message integrity (hash)
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algorithm choice is not a factor. The output line beginning with
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<code>Least strength</code> shows the strength of the weakest cipher offered.
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The scoring is based on the Qualys SSL Labs SSL Server Rating Guide, but does
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not take protocol support (TLS version) into account, which makes up 30% of the
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SSL Labs rating.
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SSLv3/TLSv1 requires more effort to determine which ciphers and compression
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methods a server supports than SSLv2. A client lists the ciphers and compressors
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that it is capable of supporting, and the server will respond with a single
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cipher and compressor chosen, or a rejection notice.
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Some servers use the client's ciphersuite ordering: they choose the first of
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the client's offered suites that they also support. Other servers prefer their
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own ordering: they choose their most preferred suite from among those the
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client offers. In the case of server ordering, the script makes extra probes to
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discover the server's sorted preference list. Otherwise, the list is sorted
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alphabetically.
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The script will warn about certain SSL misconfigurations such as MD5-signed
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certificates, low-quality ephemeral DH parameters, and the POODLE
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vulnerability.
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This script is intrusive since it must initiate many connections to a server,
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and therefore is quite noisy.
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It is recommended to use this script in conjunction with version detection
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(<code>-sV</code>) in order to discover SSL/TLS services running on unexpected
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ports. For the most common SSL ports like 443, 25 (with STARTTLS), 3389, etc.
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the script is smart enough to run on its own.
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References:
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* Qualys SSL Labs Rating Guide - https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/rating-guide/
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]]
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---
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-- @usage
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-- nmap -sV --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 <host>
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--
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-- @output
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-- PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
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-- 443/tcp open https syn-ack
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-- | ssl-enum-ciphers:
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-- | TLSv1.0:
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-- | ciphers:
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - C
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (rsa 2048) - C
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (rsa 2048) - C
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-- | compressors:
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-- | NULL
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-- | cipher preference: server
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-- | warnings:
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-- | 64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
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-- | Broken cipher RC4 is deprecated by RFC 7465
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-- | Ciphersuite uses MD5 for message integrity
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-- | Weak certificate signature: SHA1
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-- | TLSv1.2:
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-- | ciphers:
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (rsa 2048) - A
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - C
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (secp256r1) - C
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (rsa 2048) - C
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-- | TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (rsa 2048) - C
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-- | compressors:
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-- | NULL
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-- | cipher preference: server
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-- | warnings:
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-- | 64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
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-- | Broken cipher RC4 is deprecated by RFC 7465
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-- | Ciphersuite uses MD5 for message integrity
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-- |_ least strength: C
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--
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-- @xmloutput
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-- <table key="TLSv1.0">
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-- <table key="ciphers">
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- </table>
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-- <table key="compressors">
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-- <elem>NULL</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <elem key="cipher preference">server</elem>
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-- <table key="warnings">
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-- <elem>64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack</elem>
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-- <elem>Broken cipher RC4 is deprecated by RFC 7465</elem>
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-- <elem>Ciphersuite uses MD5 for message integrity</elem>
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-- <elem>Weak certificate signature: SHA1</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- </table>
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-- <table key="TLSv1.2">
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-- <table key="ciphers">
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">
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-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">
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-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">A</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">secp256r1</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <table>
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-- <elem key="kex_info">rsa 2048</elem>
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-- <elem key="name">TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5</elem>
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-- <elem key="strength">C</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- </table>
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-- <table key="compressors">
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-- <elem>NULL</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- <elem key="cipher preference">server</elem>
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-- <table key="warnings">
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-- <elem>64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack</elem>
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-- <elem>Broken cipher RC4 is deprecated by RFC 7465</elem>
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-- <elem>Ciphersuite uses MD5 for message integrity</elem>
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-- </table>
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-- </table>
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-- <elem key="least strength">C</elem>
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author = {"Mak Kolybabi <mak@kolybabi.com>", "Gabriel Lawrence"}
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license = "Same as Nmap--See https://nmap.org/book/man-legal.html"
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categories = {"discovery", "intrusive"}
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dependencies = {"https-redirect"}
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-- Test at most this many ciphersuites at a time.
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-- http://seclists.org/nmap-dev/2012/q3/156
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-- http://seclists.org/nmap-dev/2010/q1/859
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local CHUNK_SIZE = 64
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local have_ssl, openssl = pcall(require,'openssl')
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-- Add additional context (protocol) to debug output
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local function ctx_log(level, protocol, fmt, ...)
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return stdnse.debug(level, "(%s) " .. fmt, protocol, ...)
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end
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-- returns a function that yields a new tls record each time it is called
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local function get_record_iter(sock)
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local buffer = ""
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local i = 1
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local fragment
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return function ()
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local record
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i, record = tls.record_read(buffer, i, fragment)
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if record == nil then
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local status, err
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status, buffer, err = tls.record_buffer(sock, buffer, i)
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if not status then
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return nil, err
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end
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i, record = tls.record_read(buffer, i, fragment)
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if record == nil then
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return nil, "done"
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end
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end
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fragment = record.fragment
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return record
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end
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end
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local function try_params(host, port, t)
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-- Use Nmap's own discovered timeout plus 5 seconds for host processing
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-- Default to 10 seconds total.
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local timeout = ((host.times and host.times.timeout) or 5) * 1000 + 5000
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-- Create socket.
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local status, sock, err
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local specialized = sslcert.getPrepareTLSWithoutReconnect(port)
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if specialized then
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status, sock = specialized(host, port)
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if not status then
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ctx_log(1, t.protocol, "Can't connect: %s", sock)
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return nil
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end
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else
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sock = nmap.new_socket()
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sock:set_timeout(timeout)
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status, err = sock:connect(host, port)
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if not status then
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ctx_log(1, t.protocol, "Can't connect: %s", err)
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sock:close()
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return nil
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end
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end
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sock:set_timeout(timeout)
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-- Send request.
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local req = tls.client_hello(t)
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status, err = sock:send(req)
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if not status then
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ctx_log(1, t.protocol, "Can't send: %s", err)
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sock:close()
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return nil
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end
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-- Read response.
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local get_next_record = get_record_iter(sock)
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local records = {}
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while true do
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local record
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record, err = get_next_record()
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if not record then
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ctx_log(1, t.protocol, "Couldn't read a TLS record: %s", err)
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sock:close()
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return records
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end
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-- Collect message bodies into one record per type
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records[record.type] = records[record.type] or record
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local done = false
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for j = 1, #record.body do -- no ipairs because we append below
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local b = record.body[j]
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done = ((record.type == "alert" and b.level == "fatal") or
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(record.type == "handshake" and (b.type == "server_hello_done" or
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-- TLSv1.3 does not have server_hello_done
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(t.protocol == "TLSv1.3" and b.type == "server_hello")))
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)
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table.insert(records[record.type].body, b)
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end
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if done then
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sock:close()
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return records
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end
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end
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end
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local function sorted_keys(t)
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local ret = {}
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for k, _ in pairs(t) do
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ret[#ret+1] = k
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end
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table.sort(ret)
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return ret
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end
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local function in_chunks(t, size)
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size = math.floor(size)
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if size < 1 then size = 1 end
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local ret = {}
|
|
for i = 1, #t, size do
|
|
local chunk = {}
|
|
for j = i, i + size - 1 do
|
|
chunk[#chunk+1] = t[j]
|
|
end
|
|
ret[#ret+1] = chunk
|
|
end
|
|
return ret
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function remove(t, e)
|
|
for i, v in ipairs(t) do
|
|
if v == e then
|
|
table.remove(t, i)
|
|
return i
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
return nil
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function slice(t, i, j)
|
|
local output = {}
|
|
while i <= j do
|
|
output[#output+1] = t[i]
|
|
i = i + 1
|
|
end
|
|
return output
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function merge(a, b, cmp)
|
|
local output = {}
|
|
local i = 1
|
|
local j = 1
|
|
while i <= #a and j <= #b do
|
|
local winner, err = cmp(a[i], b[j])
|
|
if not winner then
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
end
|
|
if winner == a[i] then
|
|
output[#output+1] = a[i]
|
|
i = i + 1
|
|
else
|
|
output[#output+1] = b[j]
|
|
j = j + 1
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
while i <= #a do
|
|
output[#output+1] = a[i]
|
|
i = i + 1
|
|
end
|
|
while j <= #b do
|
|
output[#output+1] = b[j]
|
|
j = j + 1
|
|
end
|
|
return output
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function merge_recursive(chunks, cmp)
|
|
if #chunks == 0 then
|
|
return {}
|
|
elseif #chunks == 1 then
|
|
return chunks[1]
|
|
else
|
|
local m = math.floor(#chunks / 2)
|
|
local a, b = slice(chunks, 1, m), slice(chunks, m+1, #chunks)
|
|
local am, err = merge_recursive(a, cmp)
|
|
if not am then
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
end
|
|
local bm, err = merge_recursive(b, cmp)
|
|
if not bm then
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
end
|
|
return merge(am, bm, cmp)
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=946147
|
|
local function remove_high_byte_ciphers(t)
|
|
local output = {}
|
|
for i, v in ipairs(t) do
|
|
if tls.CIPHERS[v] <= 255 then
|
|
output[#output+1] = v
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
return output
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Get TLS extensions
|
|
local function base_extensions(host)
|
|
local tlsname = tls.servername(host)
|
|
return {
|
|
-- Claim to support common elliptic curves
|
|
-- TODO: Determine desire to comply with RFC 4492, section 4:
|
|
-- "The client MUST NOT include these extensions in the ClientHello
|
|
-- message if it does not propose any ECC cipher suites."
|
|
-- OTOH, OpenSSL 1.1.1 sends them always so it is probably safe.
|
|
["elliptic_curves"] = tls.EXTENSION_HELPERS["elliptic_curves"](tls.DEFAULT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES),
|
|
-- Some servers require Supported Point Formats Extension
|
|
["ec_point_formats"] = tls.EXTENSION_HELPERS["ec_point_formats"]({"uncompressed"}),
|
|
-- Enable SNI if a server name is available
|
|
["server_name"] = tlsname and tls.EXTENSION_HELPERS["server_name"](tlsname),
|
|
}
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Get a message body from a record which has the specified property set to value
|
|
local function get_body(record, property, value)
|
|
for i, b in ipairs(record.body) do
|
|
if b[property] == value then
|
|
return b
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
return nil
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Score a ciphersuite implementation (including key exchange info)
|
|
local function score_cipher (kex_strength, cipher_info)
|
|
local kex_score, cipher_score
|
|
if not kex_strength or not cipher_info.size then
|
|
return "unknown"
|
|
end
|
|
if kex_strength <= 0 then
|
|
return 0
|
|
elseif kex_strength < 512 then
|
|
kex_score = 0.2
|
|
elseif kex_strength < 1024 then
|
|
kex_score = 0.4
|
|
elseif kex_strength < 2048 then
|
|
kex_score = 0.8
|
|
elseif kex_strength < 4096 then
|
|
kex_score = 0.9
|
|
else
|
|
kex_score = 1.0
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
if cipher_info.size <= 0 then
|
|
return 0
|
|
elseif cipher_info.size < 128 then
|
|
cipher_score = 0.2
|
|
elseif cipher_info.size < 256 then
|
|
cipher_score = 0.8
|
|
else
|
|
cipher_score = 1.0
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Based on SSL Labs' 30-30-40 rating without the first 30% (protocol support)
|
|
return 0.43 * kex_score + 0.57 * cipher_score
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function letter_grade (score)
|
|
if not tonumber(score) then return "unknown" end
|
|
if score >= 0.80 then
|
|
return "A"
|
|
elseif score >= 0.65 then
|
|
return "B"
|
|
elseif score >= 0.50 then
|
|
return "C"
|
|
elseif score >= 0.35 then
|
|
return "D"
|
|
elseif score >= 0.20 then
|
|
return "E"
|
|
else
|
|
return "F"
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local tls13proto = tls.PROTOCOLS["TLSv1.3"]
|
|
local tls13supported = tls.EXTENSION_HELPERS.supported_versions({"TLSv1.3"})
|
|
local function get_hello_table(host, protocol)
|
|
local t = {
|
|
protocol = protocol,
|
|
record_protocol = protocol, -- improve chances of immediate rejection
|
|
extensions = base_extensions(host),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
-- supported_versions extension required for TLSv1.3
|
|
if (tls.PROTOCOLS[protocol] >= tls13proto) then
|
|
t.extensions.supported_versions = tls13supported
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
return t
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Find which ciphers out of group are supported by the server.
|
|
local function find_ciphers_group(host, port, protocol, group, scores)
|
|
local results = {}
|
|
local t = get_hello_table(host, protocol)
|
|
|
|
-- This is a hacky sort of tristate variable. There are three conditions:
|
|
-- 1. false = either ciphers or protocol is bad. Keep trying with new ciphers
|
|
-- 2. nil = The protocol is bad. Abandon thread.
|
|
-- 3. true = Protocol works, at least some cipher must be supported.
|
|
local protocol_worked = false
|
|
while (next(group)) do
|
|
t["ciphers"] = group
|
|
|
|
local records = try_params(host, port, t)
|
|
if not records then
|
|
return nil
|
|
end
|
|
local handshake = records.handshake
|
|
|
|
if handshake == nil then
|
|
local alert = records.alert
|
|
if alert then
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "Got alert: %s", alert.body[1].description)
|
|
if not tls.record_version_ok(alert["protocol"], protocol) then
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "Protocol mismatch (received %s)", alert.protocol)
|
|
-- Sometimes this is not an actual rejection of the protocol. Check specifically:
|
|
if get_body(alert, "description", "protocol_version") then
|
|
protocol_worked = nil
|
|
end
|
|
break
|
|
elseif get_body(alert, "description", "handshake_failure")
|
|
or get_body(alert, "description", "insufficient_security") then
|
|
protocol_worked = true
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "%d ciphers rejected.", #group)
|
|
break
|
|
end
|
|
elseif protocol_worked then
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "%d ciphers rejected. (No handshake)", #group)
|
|
else
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "%d ciphers and/or protocol rejected. (No handshake)", #group)
|
|
end
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
local server_hello = get_body(handshake, "type", "server_hello")
|
|
if not server_hello then
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "Unexpected record received.")
|
|
break
|
|
end
|
|
if server_hello.protocol ~= protocol then
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "Protocol rejected. cipher: %s", server_hello.cipher)
|
|
-- Some implementations will do this if a cipher is supported in some
|
|
-- other protocol version but not this one. Gotta keep trying.
|
|
if not remove(group, server_hello.cipher) then
|
|
-- But if we didn't even offer this cipher, then give up. Crazy!
|
|
protocol_worked = protocol_worked or nil
|
|
end
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
protocol_worked = true
|
|
local name = server_hello.cipher
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "Cipher %s chosen.", name)
|
|
if not remove(group, name) then
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "chose cipher %s that was not offered.", name)
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "removing high-byte ciphers and trying again.")
|
|
local size_before = #group
|
|
group = remove_high_byte_ciphers(group)
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "removed %d high-byte ciphers.", size_before - #group)
|
|
if #group == size_before then
|
|
-- No changes... Server just doesn't like our offered ciphers.
|
|
break
|
|
end
|
|
else
|
|
-- Add cipher to the list of accepted ciphers.
|
|
table.insert(results, name)
|
|
if scores then
|
|
local info = tls.cipher_info(name)
|
|
-- Some warnings:
|
|
if info.hash and info.hash == "MD5" then
|
|
scores.warnings["Ciphersuite uses MD5 for message integrity"] = true
|
|
end
|
|
if info.mode and info.mode == "CBC" and info.block_size <= 64 then
|
|
scores.warnings[("64-bit block cipher %s vulnerable to SWEET32 attack"):format(info.cipher)] = true
|
|
end
|
|
if protocol == "SSLv3" and info.mode and info.mode == "CBC" then
|
|
scores.warnings["CBC-mode cipher in SSLv3 (CVE-2014-3566)"] = true
|
|
elseif info.cipher == "RC4" then
|
|
scores.warnings["Broken cipher RC4 is deprecated by RFC 7465"] = true
|
|
end
|
|
if protocol == "TLSv1.3" and not info.tls13ok then
|
|
scores.warnings["Non-TLSv1.3 ciphersuite chosen for TLSv1.3"] = true
|
|
end
|
|
local kex = tls.KEX_ALGORITHMS[info.kex]
|
|
scores.any_pfs_ciphers = kex.pfs or scores.any_pfs_ciphers
|
|
local extra, kex_strength
|
|
if kex.export then
|
|
scores.warnings["Export key exchange"] = true
|
|
if info.kex:find("1024$") then
|
|
kex_strength = 1024
|
|
else
|
|
kex_strength = 512
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
if kex.anon then
|
|
scores.warnings["Anonymous key exchange, score capped at F"] = true
|
|
kex_strength = 0
|
|
elseif have_ssl and kex.pubkey then
|
|
local certs = get_body(handshake, "type", "certificate")
|
|
-- Assume RFC compliance:
|
|
-- "The sender's certificate MUST come first in the list."
|
|
-- This may not always be the case, so
|
|
-- TODO: reorder certificates and validate entire chain
|
|
-- TODO: certificate validation (date, self-signed, etc)
|
|
local c, err
|
|
if certs == nil then
|
|
err = "no certificate message"
|
|
else
|
|
c, err = sslcert.parse_ssl_certificate(certs.certificates[1])
|
|
end
|
|
if not c then
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "Failed to parse certificate: %s", err)
|
|
elseif c.pubkey.type == kex.pubkey then
|
|
local sigalg = c.sig_algorithm:match("([mM][dD][245])") or c.sig_algorithm:match("([sS][hH][aA]1)")
|
|
if sigalg then
|
|
kex_strength = 0
|
|
scores.warnings[("Insecure certificate signature (%s), score capped at F"):format(string.upper(sigalg))] = true
|
|
end
|
|
local rsa_bits = tls.rsa_equiv(kex.pubkey, c.pubkey.bits)
|
|
kex_strength = math.min(kex_strength or rsa_bits, rsa_bits)
|
|
if c.pubkey.exponent then
|
|
if openssl.bignum_bn2dec(c.pubkey.exponent) == "1" then
|
|
kex_strength = 0
|
|
scores.warnings["Certificate RSA exponent is 1, score capped at F"] = true
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
if c.pubkey.ecdhparams then
|
|
if c.pubkey.ecdhparams.curve_params.ec_curve_type == "namedcurve" then
|
|
extra = c.pubkey.ecdhparams.curve_params.curve
|
|
else
|
|
extra = string.format("%s %d", c.pubkey.ecdhparams.curve_params.ec_curve_type, c.pubkey.bits)
|
|
end
|
|
else
|
|
extra = string.format("%s %d", kex.pubkey, c.pubkey.bits)
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
local ske
|
|
if protocol == "TLSv1.3" then
|
|
ske = server_hello.extensions.key_share
|
|
elseif kex.server_key_exchange then
|
|
ske = get_body(handshake, "type", "server_key_exchange")
|
|
if ske then
|
|
ske = ske.data
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
if ske then
|
|
local kex_info = kex.server_key_exchange(ske, protocol)
|
|
if kex_info.strength then
|
|
local kex_type = kex_info.type or kex.type
|
|
if kex_info.ecdhparams then
|
|
if kex_info.ecdhparams.curve_params.ec_curve_type == "namedcurve" then
|
|
extra = kex_info.ecdhparams.curve_params.curve
|
|
else
|
|
extra = string.format("%s %d", kex_info.ecdhparams.curve_params.ec_curve_type, kex_info.strength)
|
|
end
|
|
else
|
|
extra = string.format("%s %d", kex_type, kex_info.strength)
|
|
end
|
|
local rsa_bits = tls.rsa_equiv(kex_type, kex_info.strength)
|
|
if kex_strength and kex_strength > rsa_bits then
|
|
kex_strength = rsa_bits
|
|
scores.warnings[(
|
|
"Key exchange (%s) of lower strength than certificate key"
|
|
):format(extra)] = true
|
|
end
|
|
kex_strength = math.min(kex_strength or rsa_bits, rsa_bits)
|
|
end
|
|
if kex_info.rsa and kex_info.rsa.exponent == 1 then
|
|
kex_strength = 0
|
|
scores.warnings["Certificate RSA exponent is 1, score capped at F"] = true
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
scores[name] = {
|
|
cipher_strength=info.size,
|
|
kex_strength = kex_strength,
|
|
extra = extra,
|
|
letter_grade = letter_grade(score_cipher(kex_strength, info))
|
|
}
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
return results, protocol_worked
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function get_chunk_size(host, protocol)
|
|
-- Try to make sure we don't send too big of a handshake
|
|
-- https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/Long-Handshake-Intolerance
|
|
local len_t = get_hello_table(host, protocol)
|
|
len_t.ciphers = {}
|
|
local cipher_len_remaining = 255 - #tls.client_hello(len_t)
|
|
-- if we're over 255 anyway, just go for it.
|
|
-- Each cipher adds 2 bytes
|
|
local max_chunks = cipher_len_remaining > 1 and cipher_len_remaining // 2 or CHUNK_SIZE
|
|
-- otherwise, use the min
|
|
return max_chunks < CHUNK_SIZE and max_chunks or CHUNK_SIZE
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Break the cipher list into chunks of CHUNK_SIZE (for servers that can't
|
|
-- handle many client ciphers at once), and then call find_ciphers_group on
|
|
-- each chunk.
|
|
local function find_ciphers(host, port, protocol)
|
|
|
|
local candidates = {}
|
|
-- TLSv1.3 ciphers are different, though some are shared (ECCPWD)
|
|
local tls13 = protocol == "TLSv1.3"
|
|
for _, c in ipairs(sorted_keys(tls.CIPHERS)) do
|
|
local info = tls.cipher_info(c)
|
|
if (not tls13 and not info.tls13only)
|
|
or (tls13 and info.tls13ok) then
|
|
candidates[#candidates+1] = c
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
local ciphers = in_chunks(candidates, get_chunk_size(host, protocol))
|
|
|
|
local results = {}
|
|
local scores = {warnings={}}
|
|
-- Try every cipher.
|
|
for _, group in ipairs(ciphers) do
|
|
local chunk, protocol_worked = find_ciphers_group(host, port, protocol, group, scores)
|
|
if protocol_worked == nil then return nil end
|
|
for _, name in ipairs(chunk) do
|
|
table.insert(results, name)
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
if not next(results) then return nil end
|
|
scores.warnings["Forward Secrecy not supported by any cipher"] = (not scores.any_pfs_ciphers) or nil
|
|
scores.any_pfs_ciphers = nil
|
|
|
|
return results, scores
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function find_compressors(host, port, protocol, good_ciphers)
|
|
local compressors = sorted_keys(tls.COMPRESSORS)
|
|
local t = get_hello_table(host, protocol)
|
|
t.ciphers = good_ciphers
|
|
|
|
local results = {}
|
|
|
|
-- Try every compressor.
|
|
local protocol_worked = false
|
|
while (next(compressors)) do
|
|
-- Create structure.
|
|
t["compressors"] = compressors
|
|
|
|
-- Try connecting with compressor.
|
|
local records = try_params(host, port, t)
|
|
local handshake = records.handshake
|
|
|
|
if handshake == nil then
|
|
local alert = records.alert
|
|
if alert then
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "Got alert: %s", alert.body[1].description)
|
|
if not tls.record_version_ok(alert["protocol"], protocol) then
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "Protocol rejected.")
|
|
protocol_worked = nil
|
|
break
|
|
elseif get_body(alert, "description", "handshake_failure") then
|
|
protocol_worked = true
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "%d compressors rejected.", #compressors)
|
|
-- Should never get here, because NULL should be good enough.
|
|
-- The server may just not be able to handle multiple compressors.
|
|
if #compressors > 1 then -- Make extra-sure it's not crazily rejecting the NULL compressor
|
|
compressors[1] = "NULL"
|
|
for i = 2, #compressors, 1 do
|
|
compressors[i] = nil
|
|
end
|
|
-- try again.
|
|
else
|
|
break
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
elseif protocol_worked then
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "%d compressors rejected. (No handshake)", #compressors)
|
|
else
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "%d compressors and/or protocol rejected. (No handshake)", #compressors)
|
|
end
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
local server_hello = get_body(handshake, "type", "server_hello")
|
|
if not server_hello then
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "Unexpected record received.")
|
|
break
|
|
end
|
|
if server_hello.protocol ~= protocol then
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "Protocol rejected.")
|
|
protocol_worked = (protocol_worked == nil) and nil or false
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
protocol_worked = true
|
|
local name = server_hello.compressor
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "Compressor %s chosen.", name)
|
|
remove(compressors, name)
|
|
|
|
-- Add compressor to the list of accepted compressors.
|
|
table.insert(results, name)
|
|
if name == "NULL" then
|
|
break -- NULL is always last choice, and must be included
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
return results
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Offer two ciphers and return the one chosen by the server. Returns nil and
|
|
-- an error message in case of a server error.
|
|
local function compare_ciphers(host, port, protocol, cipher_a, cipher_b)
|
|
local t = get_hello_table(host, protocol)
|
|
t.ciphers = {cipher_a, cipher_b}
|
|
local records = try_params(host, port, t)
|
|
local server_hello = records.handshake and get_body(records.handshake, "type", "server_hello")
|
|
if server_hello then
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "compare %s %s -> %s", cipher_a, cipher_b, server_hello.cipher)
|
|
return server_hello.cipher
|
|
else
|
|
ctx_log(2, protocol, "compare %s %s -> error", cipher_a, cipher_b)
|
|
return nil, string.format("Error when comparing %s and %s", cipher_a, cipher_b)
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Try to find whether the server prefers its own ciphersuite order or that of
|
|
-- the client.
|
|
--
|
|
-- The return value is (preference, err). preference is a string:
|
|
-- "server": the server prefers its own order. In this case ciphers is non-nil.
|
|
-- "client": the server follows the client preference. ciphers is nil.
|
|
-- "indeterminate": returned when there are only 0 or 1 ciphers. ciphers is nil.
|
|
-- nil: an error occurred during the test. err is non-nil.
|
|
-- err is an error message string that is non-nil when preference is nil or
|
|
-- indeterminate.
|
|
--
|
|
-- The algorithm tries offering two ciphersuites in two different orders. If
|
|
-- the server makes a different choice each time, "client" preference is
|
|
-- assumed. Otherwise, "server" preference is assumed.
|
|
local function find_cipher_preference(host, port, protocol, ciphers)
|
|
-- Too few ciphers to make a decision?
|
|
if #ciphers < 2 then
|
|
return "indeterminate", "Too few ciphers supported"
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Do a comparison in both directions to see if server ordering is consistent.
|
|
local cipher_a, cipher_b = ciphers[1], ciphers[2]
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "Comparing %s to %s", cipher_a, cipher_b)
|
|
local winner_forwards, err = compare_ciphers(host, port, protocol, cipher_a, cipher_b)
|
|
if not winner_forwards then
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
end
|
|
local winner_backward, err = compare_ciphers(host, port, protocol, cipher_b, cipher_a)
|
|
if not winner_backward then
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
end
|
|
if winner_forwards ~= winner_backward then
|
|
return "client", nil
|
|
end
|
|
return "server", nil
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Sort ciphers according to server preference with a modified merge sort
|
|
local function sort_ciphers(host, port, protocol, ciphers)
|
|
local chunks = {}
|
|
for _, group in ipairs(in_chunks(ciphers, get_chunk_size(host, protocol))) do
|
|
local size = #group
|
|
local chunk = find_ciphers_group(host, port, protocol, group)
|
|
if not chunk then
|
|
return nil, "Network error"
|
|
end
|
|
if #chunk ~= size then
|
|
ctx_log(1, protocol, "warning: %d ciphers offered but only %d accepted", size, #chunk)
|
|
end
|
|
table.insert(chunks, chunk)
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- The comparison operator for the merge is a 2-cipher ClientHello.
|
|
local function cmp(cipher_a, cipher_b)
|
|
return compare_ciphers(host, port, protocol, cipher_a, cipher_b)
|
|
end
|
|
local sorted, err = merge_recursive(chunks, cmp)
|
|
if not sorted then
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
end
|
|
return sorted
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local function try_protocol(host, port, protocol, upresults)
|
|
local condvar = nmap.condvar(upresults)
|
|
|
|
local results = stdnse.output_table()
|
|
|
|
-- Find all valid ciphers.
|
|
local ciphers, scores = find_ciphers(host, port, protocol)
|
|
if ciphers == nil then
|
|
condvar "signal"
|
|
return nil
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
if #ciphers == 0 then
|
|
results = {ciphers={},compressors={}}
|
|
setmetatable(results,{
|
|
__tostring=function(t) return "No supported ciphers found" end
|
|
})
|
|
upresults[protocol] = results
|
|
condvar "signal"
|
|
return nil
|
|
end
|
|
-- Find all valid compression methods.
|
|
local compressors
|
|
-- RFC 8446: "For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST contain exactly
|
|
-- one byte, set to zero"
|
|
if (tls.PROTOCOLS[protocol] < tls13proto) then
|
|
-- Reduce chunk size by 1 to allow extra room for the extra compressors (2 bytes)
|
|
for _, c in ipairs(in_chunks(ciphers, get_chunk_size(host, protocol) - 1)) do
|
|
compressors = find_compressors(host, port, protocol, c)
|
|
-- I observed a weird interaction between ECDSA ciphers and DEFLATE compression.
|
|
-- Some servers would reject the handshake if no non-ECDSA ciphers were available.
|
|
-- Sending 64 ciphers at a time should be sufficient, but we'll try them all if necessary.
|
|
if compressors and #compressors ~= 0 then
|
|
break
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Note the server's cipher preference algorithm.
|
|
local cipher_pref, cipher_pref_err = find_cipher_preference(host, port, protocol, ciphers)
|
|
|
|
-- Order ciphers according to server preference, if possible
|
|
if cipher_pref == "server" then
|
|
local sorted, err = sort_ciphers(host, port, protocol, ciphers)
|
|
if sorted then
|
|
ciphers = sorted
|
|
else
|
|
-- Can't sort, fall back to alphabetical order
|
|
table.sort(ciphers)
|
|
cipher_pref_err = err
|
|
end
|
|
else
|
|
-- fall back to alphabetical order
|
|
table.sort(ciphers)
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
-- Add rankings to ciphers
|
|
for i, name in ipairs(ciphers) do
|
|
local outcipher = {name=name, kex_info=scores[name].extra, strength=scores[name].letter_grade}
|
|
setmetatable(outcipher,{
|
|
__tostring=function(t)
|
|
if t.kex_info then
|
|
return string.format("%s (%s) - %s", t.name, t.kex_info, t.strength)
|
|
else
|
|
return string.format("%s - %s", t.name, t.strength)
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
})
|
|
ciphers[i]=outcipher
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
results["ciphers"] = ciphers
|
|
|
|
-- Format the compressor table.
|
|
if compressors then
|
|
table.sort(compressors)
|
|
end
|
|
results["compressors"] = compressors
|
|
|
|
results["cipher preference"] = cipher_pref
|
|
results["cipher preference error"] = cipher_pref_err
|
|
if next(scores.warnings) then
|
|
results["warnings"] = sorted_keys(scores.warnings)
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
upresults[protocol] = results
|
|
condvar "signal"
|
|
return nil
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
portrule = function (host, port)
|
|
return shortport.ssl(host, port) or sslcert.getPrepareTLSWithoutReconnect(port)
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
action = function(host, port)
|
|
|
|
if not have_ssl then
|
|
stdnse.verbose("OpenSSL not available; some cipher scores will be marked as unknown.")
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local results = {}
|
|
|
|
local condvar = nmap.condvar(results)
|
|
local threads = {}
|
|
|
|
for name, _ in pairs(tls.PROTOCOLS) do
|
|
stdnse.debug1("Trying protocol %s.", name)
|
|
local co = stdnse.new_thread(try_protocol, host, port, name, results)
|
|
threads[co] = true
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
repeat
|
|
for thread in pairs(threads) do
|
|
if coroutine.status(thread) == "dead" then threads[thread] = nil end
|
|
end
|
|
if ( next(threads) ) then
|
|
condvar "wait"
|
|
end
|
|
until next(threads) == nil
|
|
|
|
if not next(results) then
|
|
return nil
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
local least = "A"
|
|
for p, r in pairs(results) do
|
|
for i, c in ipairs(r.ciphers) do
|
|
-- counter-intuitive: "A" < "B", so really looking for max
|
|
least = least < c.strength and c.strength or least
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
results["least strength"] = least
|
|
|
|
return outlib.sorted_by_key(results)
|
|
end
|