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Full local backup infrastructure This is the basic infrastructure for pulling a full(*) backup of the device's data over an adb(**) connection to the local device. The basic process consists of these interacting pieces: 1. The framework's BackupManagerService, which coordinates the collection of app data and routing to the destination. 2. A new framework-provided BackupAgent implementation called FullBackupAgent, which is instantiated in the target applications' processes in turn, and knows how to emit a datastream that contains all of the app's saved data files. 3. A new shell-level program called "bu" that is used to bridge from adb to the framework's Backup Manager. 4. adb itself, which now knows how to use 'bu' to kick off a backup operation and pull the resulting data stream to the desktop host. 5. A system-provided application that verifies with the user that an attempted backup/restore operation is in fact expected and to be allowed. The full agent implementation is not used during normal operation of the delta-based app-customized remote backup process. Instead it's used during user-confirmed *full* backup of applications and all their data to a local destination, e.g. via the adb connection. The output format is 'tar'. This makes it very easy for the end user to examine the resulting dataset, e.g. for purpose of extracting files for debug purposes; as well as making it easy to contemplate adding things like a direct gzip stage to the data pipeline during backup/restore. It also makes it convenient to construct and maintain synthetic backup datasets for testing purposes. Within the tar format, certain artificial conventions are used. All files are stored within top-level directories according to their semantic origin: apps/pkgname/a/ : Application .apk file itself apps/pkgname/obb/: The application's associated .obb containers apps/pkgname/f/ : The subtree rooted at the getFilesDir() location apps/pkgname/db/ : The subtree rooted at the getDatabasePath() parent apps/pkgname/sp/ : The subtree rooted at the getSharedPrefsFile() parent apps/pkgname/r/ : Files stored relative to the root of the app's file tree apps/pkgname/c/ : Reserved for the app's getCacheDir() tree; not stored. For each package, the first entry in the tar stream is a file called "_manifest", nominally rooted at apps/pkgname. This file contains some metadata about the package whose data is stored in the archive. The contents of shared storage can optionally be included in the tar stream. It is placed in the synthetic location: shared/... uid/gid are ignored; app uids are assigned at install time, and the app's data is handled from within its own execution environment, so will automatically have the app's correct uid. Forward-locked .apk files are never backed up. System-partition .apk files are not backed up unless they have been overridden by a post-factory upgrade, in which case the current .apk *is* backed up -- i.e. the .apk that matches the on-disk data. The manifest preceding each application's portion of the tar stream provides version numbers and signature blocks for version checking, as well as an indication of whether the restore logic should expect to install the .apk before extracting the data. System packages can designate their own full backup agents. This is to manage things like the settings provider which (a) cannot be shut down on the fly in order to do a clean snapshot of their file trees, and (b) manage data that is not only irrelevant but actively hostile to non-identical devices -- CDMA telephony settings would seriously mess up a GSM device if emplaced there blind, for example. When a full backup or restore is initiated from adb, the system will present a confirmation UI that the user must explicitly respond to within a short [~ 30 seconds] timeout. This is to avoid the possibility of malicious desktop-side software secretly grabbing a copy of all the user's data for nefarious purposes. (*) The backup is not strictly a full mirror. In particular, the settings database is not cloned; it is handled the same way that it is in cloud backup/restore. This is because some settings are actively destructive if cloned onto a different (or especially a different-model) device: telephony settings and AndroidID are good examples of this. (**) On the framework side it doesn't care that it's adb; it just sends the tar stream to a file descriptor. This can easily be retargeted around whatever transport we might decide to use in the future. KNOWN ISSUES: * the security UI is desperately ugly; no proper designs have yet been done for it * restore is not yet implemented * shared storage backup is not yet implemented * symlinks aren't yet handled, though some infrastructure for dealing with them has been put in place. Change-Id: Ia8347611e23b398af36ea22c36dff0a276b1ce91
2011-04-01 14:43:32 -07:00
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!-- Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
-->
<resources xmlns:xliff="urn:oasis:names:tc:xliff:document:1.2">
<!-- Title of the activity when a full backup has been requested and must be confirmed -->
<string name="backup_confirm_title">Full backup</string>
<!-- Title of the activity when a full restore has been requested and must be confirmed -->
<string name="restore_confirm_title">Full restore</string>
Full local backup infrastructure This is the basic infrastructure for pulling a full(*) backup of the device's data over an adb(**) connection to the local device. The basic process consists of these interacting pieces: 1. The framework's BackupManagerService, which coordinates the collection of app data and routing to the destination. 2. A new framework-provided BackupAgent implementation called FullBackupAgent, which is instantiated in the target applications' processes in turn, and knows how to emit a datastream that contains all of the app's saved data files. 3. A new shell-level program called "bu" that is used to bridge from adb to the framework's Backup Manager. 4. adb itself, which now knows how to use 'bu' to kick off a backup operation and pull the resulting data stream to the desktop host. 5. A system-provided application that verifies with the user that an attempted backup/restore operation is in fact expected and to be allowed. The full agent implementation is not used during normal operation of the delta-based app-customized remote backup process. Instead it's used during user-confirmed *full* backup of applications and all their data to a local destination, e.g. via the adb connection. The output format is 'tar'. This makes it very easy for the end user to examine the resulting dataset, e.g. for purpose of extracting files for debug purposes; as well as making it easy to contemplate adding things like a direct gzip stage to the data pipeline during backup/restore. It also makes it convenient to construct and maintain synthetic backup datasets for testing purposes. Within the tar format, certain artificial conventions are used. All files are stored within top-level directories according to their semantic origin: apps/pkgname/a/ : Application .apk file itself apps/pkgname/obb/: The application's associated .obb containers apps/pkgname/f/ : The subtree rooted at the getFilesDir() location apps/pkgname/db/ : The subtree rooted at the getDatabasePath() parent apps/pkgname/sp/ : The subtree rooted at the getSharedPrefsFile() parent apps/pkgname/r/ : Files stored relative to the root of the app's file tree apps/pkgname/c/ : Reserved for the app's getCacheDir() tree; not stored. For each package, the first entry in the tar stream is a file called "_manifest", nominally rooted at apps/pkgname. This file contains some metadata about the package whose data is stored in the archive. The contents of shared storage can optionally be included in the tar stream. It is placed in the synthetic location: shared/... uid/gid are ignored; app uids are assigned at install time, and the app's data is handled from within its own execution environment, so will automatically have the app's correct uid. Forward-locked .apk files are never backed up. System-partition .apk files are not backed up unless they have been overridden by a post-factory upgrade, in which case the current .apk *is* backed up -- i.e. the .apk that matches the on-disk data. The manifest preceding each application's portion of the tar stream provides version numbers and signature blocks for version checking, as well as an indication of whether the restore logic should expect to install the .apk before extracting the data. System packages can designate their own full backup agents. This is to manage things like the settings provider which (a) cannot be shut down on the fly in order to do a clean snapshot of their file trees, and (b) manage data that is not only irrelevant but actively hostile to non-identical devices -- CDMA telephony settings would seriously mess up a GSM device if emplaced there blind, for example. When a full backup or restore is initiated from adb, the system will present a confirmation UI that the user must explicitly respond to within a short [~ 30 seconds] timeout. This is to avoid the possibility of malicious desktop-side software secretly grabbing a copy of all the user's data for nefarious purposes. (*) The backup is not strictly a full mirror. In particular, the settings database is not cloned; it is handled the same way that it is in cloud backup/restore. This is because some settings are actively destructive if cloned onto a different (or especially a different-model) device: telephony settings and AndroidID are good examples of this. (**) On the framework side it doesn't care that it's adb; it just sends the tar stream to a file descriptor. This can easily be retargeted around whatever transport we might decide to use in the future. KNOWN ISSUES: * the security UI is desperately ugly; no proper designs have yet been done for it * restore is not yet implemented * shared storage backup is not yet implemented * symlinks aren't yet handled, though some infrastructure for dealing with them has been put in place. Change-Id: Ia8347611e23b398af36ea22c36dff0a276b1ce91
2011-04-01 14:43:32 -07:00
<!-- Text for message to user that a full backup has been requested, and must be confirmed. -->
<string name="backup_confirm_text">A full backup of all data to a connected desktop computer has been requested. Do you want to allow this to happen\?\n\nIf you did not request the backup yourself, do not allow the operation to proceed.</string>
<!-- Button to allow a requested full backup to occur -->
<string name="allow_backup_button_label">Back up my data</string>
<!-- Button to refuse to allow the requested full backup -->
<string name="deny_backup_button_label">Do not back up</string>
<!-- Text for message to user that a full restore has been requested, and must be confirmed. -->
<string name="restore_confirm_text">A full restore of all data from a connected desktop computer has been requested. Do you want to allow this to happen\?\n\nIf you did not request the restore yourself, do not allow the operation to proceed. This will replace any data currently on the device!</string>
<!-- Button to allow a requested full restore to occur -->
<string name="allow_restore_button_label">Restore my data</string>
<!-- Button to refuse to allow the requested full restore -->
<string name="deny_restore_button_label">Do not restore</string>
Support full-backup encryption and global backup password If the user has supplied a backup password in Settings, that password is validated during the full backup process and is used as an encryption key for encoding the backed-up data itself. This is the fundamental mechanism whereby users can secure their data even against malicious parties getting physical unlocked access to their device. Technically the user-supplied password is not used as the encryption key for the backed-up data itself. What is actually done is that a random key is generated to use as the raw encryption key. THAT key, in turn, is encrypted with the user-supplied password (after random salting and key expansion with PBKDF2). The encrypted master key and a checksum are stored in the backup header. At restore time, the user supplies their password, which allows the system to decrypt the master key, which in turn allows the decryption of the backup data itself. The checksum is part of the archive in order to permit validation of the user-supplied password. The checksum is the result of running the user-supplied password through PBKDF2 with a randomly selected salt. At restore time, the proposed password is run through PBKDF2 with the salt described by the archive header. If the result does not match the archive's stated checksum, then the user has supplied the wrong decryption password. Also, suppress backup consideration for a few packages whose data is either nonexistent or inapplicable across devices or factory reset operations. Bug 4901637 Change-Id: Id0cc9d0fdfc046602b129f273d48e23b7a14df36
2011-07-19 16:32:49 -07:00
<!-- Text for message to user that they must enter their predefined backup password in order to perform this operation. -->
<string name="current_password_text">Please enter your current backup password below:</string>
<!-- Text for message to user that they must enter their device encryption password in order to perform this restore operation. -->
<string name="device_encryption_restore_text">Please enter your device encryption password below.</string>
<!-- Text for message to user that they must enter their device encryption password in order to perform this backup operation. -->
<string name="device_encryption_backup_text">Please enter your device encryption password below. This will also be used to encrypt the backup archive.</string>
<!-- Text for message to user that they must enter an encryption password to use for the full backup operation. -->
<string name="backup_enc_password_text">Please enter a password to use for encrypting the full backup data. If this is left blank, your current backup password will be used:</string>
Support full-backup encryption and global backup password If the user has supplied a backup password in Settings, that password is validated during the full backup process and is used as an encryption key for encoding the backed-up data itself. This is the fundamental mechanism whereby users can secure their data even against malicious parties getting physical unlocked access to their device. Technically the user-supplied password is not used as the encryption key for the backed-up data itself. What is actually done is that a random key is generated to use as the raw encryption key. THAT key, in turn, is encrypted with the user-supplied password (after random salting and key expansion with PBKDF2). The encrypted master key and a checksum are stored in the backup header. At restore time, the user supplies their password, which allows the system to decrypt the master key, which in turn allows the decryption of the backup data itself. The checksum is part of the archive in order to permit validation of the user-supplied password. The checksum is the result of running the user-supplied password through PBKDF2 with a randomly selected salt. At restore time, the proposed password is run through PBKDF2 with the salt described by the archive header. If the result does not match the archive's stated checksum, then the user has supplied the wrong decryption password. Also, suppress backup consideration for a few packages whose data is either nonexistent or inapplicable across devices or factory reset operations. Bug 4901637 Change-Id: Id0cc9d0fdfc046602b129f273d48e23b7a14df36
2011-07-19 16:32:49 -07:00
<!-- Text for message to user that they may optionally supply an encryption password to use for a full backup operation. -->
<string name="backup_enc_password_optional">If you wish to encrypt the full backup data, enter a password below:</string>
<!-- Text for message to user that they must supply an encryption password to use for a full backup operation because their phone is locked. -->
<string name="backup_enc_password_required">Since your device is encrypted, you are required to encrypt your backup. Please enter a password below:</string>
Support full-backup encryption and global backup password If the user has supplied a backup password in Settings, that password is validated during the full backup process and is used as an encryption key for encoding the backed-up data itself. This is the fundamental mechanism whereby users can secure their data even against malicious parties getting physical unlocked access to their device. Technically the user-supplied password is not used as the encryption key for the backed-up data itself. What is actually done is that a random key is generated to use as the raw encryption key. THAT key, in turn, is encrypted with the user-supplied password (after random salting and key expansion with PBKDF2). The encrypted master key and a checksum are stored in the backup header. At restore time, the user supplies their password, which allows the system to decrypt the master key, which in turn allows the decryption of the backup data itself. The checksum is part of the archive in order to permit validation of the user-supplied password. The checksum is the result of running the user-supplied password through PBKDF2 with a randomly selected salt. At restore time, the proposed password is run through PBKDF2 with the salt described by the archive header. If the result does not match the archive's stated checksum, then the user has supplied the wrong decryption password. Also, suppress backup consideration for a few packages whose data is either nonexistent or inapplicable across devices or factory reset operations. Bug 4901637 Change-Id: Id0cc9d0fdfc046602b129f273d48e23b7a14df36
2011-07-19 16:32:49 -07:00
<!-- Text for message to user when performing a full restore operation, explaining that they must enter the password originally used to encrypt the full backup data. -->
<string name="restore_enc_password_text">If the restore data is encrypted, please enter the password below:</string>
<!-- Text of a toast telling the user that a full backup operation has begun -->
<string name="toast_backup_started">Backup starting...</string>
<!-- Text of a toast telling the user that a full backup operation has ended -->
<string name="toast_backup_ended">Backup finished</string>
<!-- Text of a toast telling the user that a full restore operation has begun -->
<string name="toast_restore_started">Restore starting...</string>
<!-- Text of a toast telling the user that a full restore operation has ended -->
<string name="toast_restore_ended">Restore ended</string>
<!-- Text of a toast telling the user that the operation has timed out -->
<string name="toast_timeout">Operation timed out</string>
Full local backup infrastructure This is the basic infrastructure for pulling a full(*) backup of the device's data over an adb(**) connection to the local device. The basic process consists of these interacting pieces: 1. The framework's BackupManagerService, which coordinates the collection of app data and routing to the destination. 2. A new framework-provided BackupAgent implementation called FullBackupAgent, which is instantiated in the target applications' processes in turn, and knows how to emit a datastream that contains all of the app's saved data files. 3. A new shell-level program called "bu" that is used to bridge from adb to the framework's Backup Manager. 4. adb itself, which now knows how to use 'bu' to kick off a backup operation and pull the resulting data stream to the desktop host. 5. A system-provided application that verifies with the user that an attempted backup/restore operation is in fact expected and to be allowed. The full agent implementation is not used during normal operation of the delta-based app-customized remote backup process. Instead it's used during user-confirmed *full* backup of applications and all their data to a local destination, e.g. via the adb connection. The output format is 'tar'. This makes it very easy for the end user to examine the resulting dataset, e.g. for purpose of extracting files for debug purposes; as well as making it easy to contemplate adding things like a direct gzip stage to the data pipeline during backup/restore. It also makes it convenient to construct and maintain synthetic backup datasets for testing purposes. Within the tar format, certain artificial conventions are used. All files are stored within top-level directories according to their semantic origin: apps/pkgname/a/ : Application .apk file itself apps/pkgname/obb/: The application's associated .obb containers apps/pkgname/f/ : The subtree rooted at the getFilesDir() location apps/pkgname/db/ : The subtree rooted at the getDatabasePath() parent apps/pkgname/sp/ : The subtree rooted at the getSharedPrefsFile() parent apps/pkgname/r/ : Files stored relative to the root of the app's file tree apps/pkgname/c/ : Reserved for the app's getCacheDir() tree; not stored. For each package, the first entry in the tar stream is a file called "_manifest", nominally rooted at apps/pkgname. This file contains some metadata about the package whose data is stored in the archive. The contents of shared storage can optionally be included in the tar stream. It is placed in the synthetic location: shared/... uid/gid are ignored; app uids are assigned at install time, and the app's data is handled from within its own execution environment, so will automatically have the app's correct uid. Forward-locked .apk files are never backed up. System-partition .apk files are not backed up unless they have been overridden by a post-factory upgrade, in which case the current .apk *is* backed up -- i.e. the .apk that matches the on-disk data. The manifest preceding each application's portion of the tar stream provides version numbers and signature blocks for version checking, as well as an indication of whether the restore logic should expect to install the .apk before extracting the data. System packages can designate their own full backup agents. This is to manage things like the settings provider which (a) cannot be shut down on the fly in order to do a clean snapshot of their file trees, and (b) manage data that is not only irrelevant but actively hostile to non-identical devices -- CDMA telephony settings would seriously mess up a GSM device if emplaced there blind, for example. When a full backup or restore is initiated from adb, the system will present a confirmation UI that the user must explicitly respond to within a short [~ 30 seconds] timeout. This is to avoid the possibility of malicious desktop-side software secretly grabbing a copy of all the user's data for nefarious purposes. (*) The backup is not strictly a full mirror. In particular, the settings database is not cloned; it is handled the same way that it is in cloud backup/restore. This is because some settings are actively destructive if cloned onto a different (or especially a different-model) device: telephony settings and AndroidID are good examples of this. (**) On the framework side it doesn't care that it's adb; it just sends the tar stream to a file descriptor. This can easily be retargeted around whatever transport we might decide to use in the future. KNOWN ISSUES: * the security UI is desperately ugly; no proper designs have yet been done for it * restore is not yet implemented * shared storage backup is not yet implemented * symlinks aren't yet handled, though some infrastructure for dealing with them has been put in place. Change-Id: Ia8347611e23b398af36ea22c36dff0a276b1ce91
2011-04-01 14:43:32 -07:00
</resources>